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r 
EXPLANAT6t\Y  MEMORANDUM 
It is  recalled  that  following  the  nuclear 
1988  the  Council is  Atomic  Questions 
requested  that  the  Commission  should 
detailed report on  Euratom  Safeguards. 
affairs  in 
Group  had 
prepare  a 
2.  The  European  Parliament  in  resolution  of  6  July  1988 
published  in  the  O.J.  N°  C235/70  of  12-09-1988  "calls 
on  the  Euratom  Safeguards  Directorate  to  submit  a 
comprehensive  annual  report  to  parliament  which  would 
be  available to the public". 
3.  Consequently  the  Commission  presented  a 
comprehensive  report  (SEC  {90}  452)  final 
particular reference to  1988. 
first 
with 
4.  During  the  discussions  in  the  Council  and  in response 
to  questions  from  the  Parliament  the  Commission  re-
confirmed  its  intention to  prepare  such  an  operations 
report  on  a  biennial  basis. 
5.  The  aim  of  the  present  report  is  to  provide  a 
comprehensive  survey  for  the period  1989  - 1990. - '1-
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Scope  of this report 
1.  In  its Report  (SEC{90}452)  final  hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  "1988 
Report"  the  Commission  presented  a  first  comprehensive  report  with 
particular  reference  to  1988  on  the  operations  of  Euratom  safeguards 
and  the  Commission  invited  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  to 
note its content. 
2.  During  the  discussions  in the  Council  and  in response to questions  from 
Parliament the  Commission  re-confirmed its intention to prepare  such  an 
operations  report  on  a  biennial basis. 
3.  The  aim  of  the  present  report  covering  1989  and  1990  is  to  provide  a 
comprehensive  survey  on  the  operation  of  Euratom  safeguards  in  the 
civil  nuclear  fuel  cycle  including  research  and  other  related 
activities  of  the  European  Community.  The  survey  includes  the 
safeguards  findings  with  particular  reference  to  1989  and  1990,  the 
issues  under  discussion  or  consultation  with  operators  or  under 
consultation  with  national  authorities,  a  survey  on  the  available 
resources  and  an  indication  of  the  trends  in  and  challenges  to 
safeguards during the years to  come. 
4.  The  report  is addressed  to the  Council  and  to  the  European  Parliament, 
which  are  invited to note its contents. 
Safeguards 
5.  The  word  safeguards,  in the  framework  of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  means  the 
set  of  measures  performed  to  enable  the  Commission  to  satisfy  itself 
that  nuclear  material  is  not  diverted  from  its  intended  and  declared 
uses  (particularly  to  unlawful  non-peaceful  applications)  (Article 
77a))  and  that  obligations  arising  from  International  Agreements 
concluded  by  the  Community  (Article  77b))  are  complied  with.  Examples 
of  the  latter  undertakings  are  (in  addition  to  peaceful  pledge) 
restrictions on  retransfers outside the  Community  and  certain controls 
on  heavy  water,  equipment  and  tritium. Chapter  I 
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6.  Safeguards  are  therefore  not,  as  is  sometimes  mistakenly  believed, 
concerned  with  nuclear  safety  nor  with the protection of  people  and  of 
the  environment  from  the  hazards  of  ionizing  radiation  nor  with 
physical  protection.  Nuclear  safety  relates  to  the  safe  design  and 
operation  of  nuclear  facilities.  Radiation  protection  controls  relate 
to  health  and  safety,  environmental  protection,  safe  handling 
procedures  for  nuclear  materials  etc.  Physical  protection  relates  to 
the  security  measures  taken  to  protect  material  from  theft  or  other 
misuses.  Safeguards  may  take  advantage  of  such  measures  in  designing 
verification  schemes  but  they  are,  in  themselves,  quite  independent. 
Whereas  physical  protection  is mainly  the  responsibility of  the  Member 
States,  the  Commission  is responsible  for the applciation of  safeguards 
pursuant  to Chapter  VII  of  the  Treaty. 
7.  Chapter  VII  of  the  Treaty  provides  for  safeguards  to  be  applied to all 
civil  nuclear  materials  stored,  used  or  transported  within  the 
Community.  The  activities  involved  include  therefore  the  main  fuel 
cycle  activities  of  uranium  mining,  conversion,  enrichment, 
fabrication,  power  reactor  operation,  reprocessing  and  waste  storage 
and  disposal  insofar  as  ores,  source  or  special  fissile materials  are 
concerned.  Also  included  are  the  full  range  of  other  activities  which 
use  source or special  fissile materials,  viz: 
laboratories,  service  activities  for  the 
analytical  laboratories),  research  reactors 
materials  in non-nuclear activities. 
research  and  development, 
nuclear  industry  (e.g. 
and  the  use  of  nuclear 
8.  The  Euratom  Treaty  provides  for  the  application  of  safeguards  to  all 
civil  nuclear  material  as  a  fundamental  function  of  Community  law, 
establishing to  this  end  a  direct  relation  between  the  Commission  and 
operators  whereas  the  Treaty  on  the  Non-Proliferation  of  Nuclear 
Weapons  (NPT)  provides  for  the  application  of  safeguards  by  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  ( IAEA)  in  the  non-nuclear  weapon 
States  of  the  Community.  Member  States  are  also  associated  in  the 
implementation  of  Euratom  Safeguards  within  the  limits  set  out  by  the 
Treaty  and  its  implementing  Regulation.  IAEA  safeguards  also  apply  in 
nuclear  weapon  States  following  "voluntary  offers"  by  those  States. 
IAEA  safeguards  are exclusively aimed  at ensuring,  as  appropriate,  non-
explosive or  peaceful  use  of  safeguarded material  and  apply worldwide 
on  a  contractual  basis,  through  safeguards  agreements  and  entailing  a 
direct  relation  only  between  the  IAEA  and  its  Member  States.  In  the 
Community,  the  Safeguards  Agreements  concluded  by  Euratom,  the  Member 
States  and  the  IAEA  ensure  the  necessary  coordination  between  the  two 
safeguards  systems. 
Legal  bases 
9.  The  obligations  and  responsibilities of  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities  in the  field of  safeguards  are  set out  in Articles  77  to 85 
of  Chapter VII  of  the  Euratom  Treaty.  It is European  law. Chapter  I 
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10.  The  provisions  of  Articles  77  to  85  of  the Treaty specify: 
Art.  77: 
Art.  78: 
Art.  79: 
Art.  80: 
Art.  81: 
Art.  82: 
Art.  83: 
Art.  84: 
Art.  85: 
In  essence,  the  Commission  shall  satisfy  itself  that  the 
nuclear materials are  not  diverted  from their intended uses 
as  declared  by  the  users  and  that  the  provisions  relating 
to  supply  and  any  particular  safeguarding  obligations 
assumed  by  the  Community  under  an  agreement  concluded  with 
third countries or with  an  international organization  (e.g. 
the  Internationai Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA))  are complied 
with.  Pursuant  tb  this  article,  Euratom  Safeguards  also 
monitor,  and  report on,  the  implementation  of  Chapter  VI  of 
the  Treaty. 
It  may  be  mentioned  in  this  context  that  as  of 
3  October  1990  the Commission  mandate  under  Chapter VII  was 
extended  to  the·  new  "Bundeslander"  following  German 
unification  (cf.  para.40) 
The  declaration  by  operators  of  the  basic  technical 
characteristics  of  the  installations  as  well  as  the  need 
for  Commission  approval  of  techniques  to  be  used  for  the 
chemical  processing of  irradiated materials. 
In  this  context  it  may  be  mentioned  that  the  Commission 
gave  interim  approval  in  1990  relating  to  a  large-scale 
reprocessing plant. 
Requirements  on  operators  to  maintain  a  system  of  nuclear 
materials  accounting,  including  recording  and  reporting. 
Obligation on  the  Commission  to promulgate  a  Regulation; 
Deposit  of  excess  special  fissile materials  not  in use; 
Inspections;  right  of  access;  procedures  in  case  of 
opposition; 
Recruitment  of  inspectors.  Follow-up  procedures  involving 
Member  States  in case of  infringement; 
Sanctions  in case of  infringements  by  operators; 
It  may  be  mentioned  in  this  context  that  the 
imposed  in  1990  a  sanction  on  a  Community 
following  an  infringement. 
Commission 
undertaking 
Scope  of  safeguards  and  exclusion for materials  intended to 
meet  defence  requirements; 
Adaptation  by  the  Council  of  the  procedures  for  applying 
safeguards. 
11.  Commission  Regulation  (Euratom)  No  3227/76  of  19.10.1976  (O.J.  E.C.  No 
L363  of  31.12.1976)  as  amended  by  Commission  Regulation  (Euratom)  No 
220/90  of  26.01.1990  (O.J.E.C.  L22  of  27.01.90},  specifies  general 
obligations  on  operators  with  respect  to  the  provision  of  basic 
technical  characteristics,  recording,  reporting,  advance  notification 
of  transfers.  The  regulation  also  specifies  the  requirement  to  adopt 
Particular Safeguards  Provisions  (PSP)  for  each  installation. Chapter  I 
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12.  The  Community  has  concluded  agreements  in  the  nuclear  field  with  the 
u.s.,  Canada  and  Australia.  To  verify  the  implementation  of  the 
undertakings  included  therein,  the  Commission  acting  through  its 
Euratom  Safeguards  Directorate  tracks  relevant  material  under  specific 
safeguarding  obligations,  each  identified  by  an  appropriate  code 
("flag"). 
13.  The  Community  has  concluded  three  Safeguards  Agreements  with  the  IAEA 
based  on  model  agreement  INFCIRC/153,  but  including  a  protocol 
regulating  the  interface  between  the  Euratom  and  IAEA  safeguards 
systems: 
13.A. 
13.8. 
13.c. 
Means 
Agreement1)  between  the  Community,  its  Non-Nuclear  Weapon 
States  (NNWS)  and  the  IAEA; 
Agreement2)  between  the  Community,  the  United  Kingdom  (UK)  and 
the  IAEA; 
Agreement3)  between  the  Community,  France  and  the  IAEA. 
14.  In  order  to  fulfill  the  mandate  of  Article  77  of  the  Treaty,  the 
Commission  has,  since  1958,  deployed  a  corps  of  Euratom  safeguards 
inspectors.  The  funds  are provided through  budget  chapter 8.4200. 
15.  In  accordance  with  the  legal  provisions  referred  to  above  the  Euratom 
safeguards  inspectors  of  the  Safeguards  Directorate  DG  XVI I-E  ( "DCS") 
perform  inspections  in  the  nuclear  installations  and  perform  relevant 
headquarters  accountancy evaluation  and  follow-up. 
16.  Inspections  and  accountancy  supported  by  appropriate  logistics  are  the 
main  pillars  of  Euratom  safeguards;  no  adequate  verification  can  be 
carried out unless these operate effectively. 
1)  Published  in  IAEA  document  INFCIRC/193 
2)  Published  in  IAEA  document  INFCIRC/263 
3)  Published  in  IAEA  document  INFCIRC/290 Chapter  II 
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II.  SAFEGUARDS  OPERATION 
Number  of Material  Balance  Areas  (MBAs)  and  stocks  of  nuclear material 
17.  In the  "1988  Report"  the Commission  had  presented the  number  of 
installations under  Euratom  safeguards. 
This  presentation resulted,  however,  in  a  certain lack of transparency: 
17.A. 
17 .B. 
A  large  installation comprising several  balance  areas  (MBA's) 
counted  as  one  installation in the  same  way  as  an  installation 
holding tiny quantities of  nuclear material; 
The  large  number  of Locations Outside Facilitiesl), carriers, 
intermediaries etc.  accounted  for  47%  of all installations 
under  safeguards  where  less  than  2%  of the  cumulative 
inspection effort was  spent. 
18.  In  order,  thus to  avoid  the  above  disadvantages of presentation,  the 
previous  table II.1  has  been split into  two  parts. 
Table  II.1.1.  presents the  number  of material  balance  areas  (MBA)  under 
Euratom  safeguards.  It may  be  noted that  an  MBA  is the basic 
safeguards entity i.e.  an  area  such that a)  each transfer into or out 
of  and  b)  the physical  inventory of  nuclear material  can  be  determined. 
Table  II.1.2.  presents the  number  of  LOFs,  Carriers,  intermediaries 
etc.  including those  "installations" which  are,  for  purposes  of  IAEA 
safeguards,  combined  into  1  accounting  and  reporting unit  referred to 
as  CAM  (see Glossary attached). 
1)  Locations  outside  facilities  (LOF)  are  MBAs  holding  lees  than  1 
effective  kilogram  but  more  than  the  upper  limit  for  CAM  facilities 
(see  Glossary  attached).  For  the  definition  of  an  effective  kilogram 
cf.  Regulation  3227/76,  quoted  under  paragraph  11  above, 
Article  36  (o). Type 
Research  laboratories 
Mines 
Concentration 
Transformation 
Enrichment 
Fuel  Preparation 
Fuel  Fabrication 
Reprocessing 
Research  Reactors 
Zero  Energy  Critical  assemblies 
Power  Reactors 
Storage 
T  0  T A L  Euratom 
T  0  T A L  IAEA 
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Table  11.1.1. 
MBAs  under  Euratom  Safeguards 
(Status  1990-12-31) 
Member  States 
B  01(  D  E  F  GR  !RL  I 
4  1  10  1  12  2 
9  2  1 
1  1  2  2  1 
1  . 
2  1 
.  3  . 
3  1  7  2  6  .  2 
1  5  2 
3  2  14  3  12  1  7 
2  .  11  2 
7  29  10  57  .  4 
2  2  18  14  6 
22  7  103  20  114  1  0  24 
21  6  89  16  1  1  0  23 
Chapter  II 
EUR  IAEA 
L  WL  p  UK  COM  1) 
.  2  23  3  58  23 
13  25  0 
1  8  0 
.  1  0 
2  3  - 8  6 
4  .  7  0 
3  24  15 
6  14  3 
2  1  5  1  51  34 
.  3  18  13 
2  - 20  129  52 
1  1  23  4  71  35 
1  8  16  90  8  414  --
1  8  2  5  8  --- 181 
It  may  be  noted  that  the  above  table  comprises  the  additional  MBAs  put 
under  Euratom  and  IAEA  safeguards  following  German  unification on  3  October 
1990. 
1)  Under  IAEA  routine  inspection. Type 
Chapter  II 
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Table  II.  1. 2. 
LOFs,  Intermediaries,  Carriers  and  other installations 
holding  less than  1  effective kg. 
Member  States 
B  DK  D  E  F  GR  !RL  [  L  NL  p  UK  COM 
EUR  !AEA 
LOFs  equal/above  CAM  limit  3  4  39  10  2  2  15  10  1  19  3  108  79 
LOFs  below  CAM  limit, 
CARRIERS,  INTERMEDIARIES, 
WASTE  CONDITIONING  AND  OTHERS  3  3  39  2  35  10  2  4  2  120  1  221  4.1 
T 
T 
0  T  A L  Euratom  6  7  78  2  45  2  2  25  2  14  3  139  4  329  ---
0  T A L  IAEA  5  6  69  2  0  2  2  18  0  13  1  0  2  --- 120 
19.  The  above  tables II.l.l.  and  II.l.  2.  give  also  the  summary .of  the  MBAs 
under  IAEA  routine  inspection.  MBAs  under  IAEA  safeguards  in  NWS  are 
inspected  by  the  IAEA  if  designated  to  this  effect  by  the  latter, 
pursuant  to  the  prov~sions  of  the  Agreements  INFCIRC/263  and 
INFCIRC/290. 
20.  Among  the  MBAs  listed  in  table  II.l.l.  tl1ere  are  60  MBAs,  located  in 
France  and  the  United  Kingdom,". referred  to· as  "mixed"  MBA~.  At  these 
MBAs,  civil  and  non-civil  material  are  ha.nciled,  processed:  ..  or  stored 
together either simultaneously or sequentially. Chapter  II 
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Stocks of  nuclear material 
21.  The  following  table  II.2  gives  the  stocks  of  civil  nuclear  material  by 
the  end  of  1988,  1989  and  1990  for  the  MBAs  listed  in  tables  II.l.l. 
and  II.l.2. 
Table  II.2 
Stocks  of  nuclear material  as  on-31  December: 
Material  Category  Cat  1988 
Uranium  Depletedl)  D  107  600  t 
Naturall)  N  46  400  t 
Low  Enrichedl)  L  27  400  t 
High  Enrichedl)  H  12  t 
Plutoniuml)  p  151  t 
Thoriuml)  TH  1  500  t 
Total effective kg3}  179  000 
1)  Rounded  to nearest  100 t. 
*) 
l)  Rounded  to nearest t. 
3)  Art.  36(o)  of  Regulation  3227/76. 
It  may  be  noted  that 
Plutonium  stock  was  in 
Plutonium. 
on  31.12.90 
the  form  of 
1989 
112  600  t 
47  000  t 
28  900  t 
13  t 
170  t 
2  100  t 
199  000 
approximately 
fresh  (i.e. 
1990 
124  400  t 
44  000  t 
32  000  t 
13  t 
203  t*) 
2  600  t 
231  000 
30%  of  the 
reprocessed) Chapter  II 
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22.  The  following  table  II.3 gives  the distribution  (rounded to the  nearest 
0.1%)  of  the  stocks  (end  1990)  as  a  function  of  the  MBA  type. 
Table  II.  3 
Distribution of Stocks  (end)  1990 
(rounded  to the nearest  0.1  %) 
as  per  installation type  and  element  category. 
Type  Element  Category 
D  N  L  H 
Research  Laboratories  0.8  -o  -o  2.2 
Research  Reactors  &  -o  0.3  -o  44.3 
Critical Assemblies 
Enrichment  30.7  8.9  56.9  -o 
Fuel  Concentration, 
Fuel  Conversion/Fabrication  2.3  52.3  2.9  14.2 
Reprocessing  0.2  -o  1.0  0.9 
Power  Reactors  1.9  15.9  20.3  18.4 
Storage  63.5  18.4  18.9  20.0 
LOFs,  Mines,  others  0.6  4.2  -o  -o 
p  T 
0.3  1.3 
1  0.6 
-o  -o 
6.3  0.4 
0.5  -o 
21.6  0.3 
70.2  0.4 
0.1  97.0 Chapter  II 
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Safeguards  approaches  and  implementation  - Introductory  remarks 
23.  Pursuant  to  Article  79  of  the  Treaty  and  to  Articles  9  to  23  of 
Regulation  3227/76,  the operators of all installations must  establish a 
nuclear  materials  accounting  system  including  recording  and  reporting 
thereby  documenting  the  movements  and  disposition  of  the  nuclear 
material. 
In other words,  the up-to-date  inventory of nuclear material  by: 
category of materiall) 
safeguards obligation  and 
material  balance  areas  (MBA) 
as  established  by  the  operator  needs  to  be  made  available  for 
verification  by  inspectors,  as  well  as  the  flow  of  nuclear  materials. 
Verification  relates  to  the  set  of  activities  independently  performed 
by  inspectors  to  establish  the  correctness  of  these  records  on  flow 
and  inventory  in  comparison  with  the  physical  reality  leading  to 
acceptance or rejection of  the  operators declarations. 
24.  There  are  several,  basically  different,  safeguards  verification 
techniques,  certain of  which  are quantifiable and others which  are  non-
quantifiab1e.  In  this  context  reference  is  made  to  paragraphs  22  and 
23  of  the  "1988  Report"  where  the  basic  methodology  is  outlined  and 
examples  are  given. 
25.  There  is  no  change  in  principle  of  the  safeguards  methodology  which 
continues  to  be  based  on  the  safeguards. goals  comprising  a  triptych of 
characteristic  quantities  to  be  detected,  of  characteristic  times 
describing  the  maximum  response  times  of  the  safeguards  system  and 
characteristic probabilities describing  both  the  risk of  a  false  alarm 
and  the  risk of  non-detection of the  amounts  within the  specified time. 
26.  As  far  as,  however,  the  safeguards  concepts  and  approaches,  developed 
to  implement  the  above  goals,  are  concerned,  in  particular  because  of 
the  increased  availability  and  use  of  Plutonium  in the  commercial  fuel 
cycle  of  the  Community,  necessitated  in  1989  and  1990  and  continue  to 
necessitate  the  further  improvement  of  safeguards  efficiency  and  the 
related refinement of  safeguards  concepts  and  procedures.  A  summary  of 
the  main  developments  is reported  below. 
1)  Art.  21  of  Regulation  3227/76. Chapter  II 
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27.  Improvements  of  the  efficiency  in  safeguarding  Uranium  have  been 
achieved  and  are  expected  to  be  further  achieved  gradually  through  the 
introduction  of  improved  instruments  and  equipment  and  through 
rationalization  measures  adapted  specifically  to  the  intermittent 
inspection  regime  which  is applied at the  installations in this part of 
the  fuel  cycle  including  the  output  of  the  mines,  concentration, 
conversion,  fabrication  and  enrichment  installations  (the  latter 
require  slightly  different  approaches  due  to  the  inherent  commercial 
and  non-proliferation sensitivity of  the technology used). 
Developments  to  be  mentioned  are  the  progressive 
introduction  of  new  containment  and  surveillance  (C/S) 
equipment,  e.g.  using  front  end  motion  detection, 
improved  methods  used  for  item  verification,  shifting 
from  destructive  assay  (DA)  to  non  destructive  assay 
(NDA)  and,  last  but  not  least,  improved  on-site  data 
acquisition,  handling  and  evaluation.  The 
implementation  of  "Random"  inspections  while 
mathematically  quite  elegant  - continues  to  be  tested 
by  Euratom  in  an  operational  production  plant  with,  so 
far,  inconclusive results. 
28.  Thus,  in the  Uranium  part  of  the  fuel  cycle  as  well  as  for  LWR  LEU,  no 
significant  changes  in  the  concepts  and  approaches  can  be  reported  but 
rather  gradual  increases of efficiency. 
29.  For  LWR-using  fresh  Max*)  the  safeguards  concepts  continue to  be  based 
on  the  item verification techniques,  i.e.  based  on  the  verification of 
the  integrity  and  identity of  distinguishable  fuel  elements. using  NDA, 
C/S  and  video  surveillance  techniques  from  fabrication  and  during  all 
phases  of  reactor  operations.  These  concepts  have  been  implemented 
requiring,  however,  still  considerable  inspection  .effort.  It  is 
expected  that  this  inspection  effort  can  be  reduced  when  either  the 
time  interval  between  fresh  MOX*)  arrival  and  core  loading  can  be 
reduced  to  not  more  than  a  few  weeks  or,  alternatively,  the  equipment 
allowing  conclusive  underwater  measurement  will  become  fully 
operational. 
30.  For  safeguards  of  MOX  fabrication  installations  and  of  reprocessing 
plants paragraph  101  of  the Operations Report  covering  1988  (SEC(90)452 
final)  indicated  the  forecast  that  the  throughputs  of  recycled 
Plutonium was  expected to  increase significantly in the late 1980's and 
early 1990's. 
This  has  become  industrial reality,  i.e.: 
A  large  scale  reprocessing  plant  commenced 
operation  in 1989; 
Two  further  large  scale  reprocessing  plants  are 
under  construction  and,  based  on  present  plans, 
will  commence  operation  in  1992  and  1994 
respectively; 
Two  large  scale  MOX  fabrication  plants  are  under 
construction  and  will  commence  operation,  based  on 
----------------~~r~esent schedules,  in  1992  and  1993  respectively. 
*)  MOX  MIXED  OXIDE  (U+Pu  oxide) Chapter  II 
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31.  At  these  new  plants  continual  inspection  is  maintained  or  foreseen. 
Following consultations with  Community  operators  and,  when  appropriate, 
with  the  IAEA,  modern  safeguards  systems  have  been  developed  and  are 
progressively being  implemented. 
32.  Under  the aspect  of  safeguards  concepts  no  significant  new  developments 
can  be  reported  since the well-known  concepts  such  as: 
verification  of  the  technical  characteristics  of  the  plant  during 
the construction 
verification  of 
Characteristics 
3227/76; 
phases; 
the  continued 
(BTC)  to  be 
validity 
provided 
of  the  Basic  Technical 
pursuant  to  Regulation 
verification  of  all  input  and  output  streams  and  of  the  physical 
inventory; 
verification  of,  at  least  monthly, of  the  hold-ups  using  various 
techniques or  Follow-up  and  Balancing  Of  Mixes  (FBOM) 
maintenance of the continuity of  knowledge  in the  input  and  product 
stores 
are being  used  or envisaged  for  the  new plants. 
33.  As  far,  however,  as  the  approaches  are  concerned  the  main  feature  of 
the  safeguards  systems  for  the  new  plutonium  plants  is  a  significant 
shift  from  inspector  attended  operation  to  unattended  measurement, 
monitoring or surveillance operation. 
This  is caused,  inter alia,  by 
a)  the  need  to  minimize  radiation  exposure  of  plant  personnel  and 
inspectors; 
b)  the  need  to  minimize  stoppage  for  routine  safeguards  purposes  of 
automated  production,  and 
c)  the  requirement  to 
plants  so  as  to 
standardization. 
use  identical  or  similar 
minimize  development  costs 
components  in  all 
and  to  maximize 
34.  The  effect  is,  on  the  one  hand,  a  transition  from  operational  costs, 
i.e.  manpower,  travelling,  subsistence,  etc.  to  investment  costs which, 
albeit  expensive  initially,  is expected  to  "pay  off"  within  a  limited 
break even time.  on  the other  hand,  these systems  are also expected to 
minimize  repetitive  inspectors  work  thereby  further  contributing  to 
enhanced  safeguards  effectiveness. Chapter  II 
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Safeguards  approaches  and  implementation  - Verification techniques 
35.  The  following  table  II.  4  provides  an  indication  of  the  verification 
techniques  deployed.  Table  II.S  provides  the  typical  frequency  of 
inspection  and  the  Euratom  inspection effort  spent  at the various types 
of  installations.  Table  II.6  provides  the  inspection  effort  spent  in 
the  Community  Member  States. 
Table  II.  4 
Verification technique 
verification and  periodic 
reverification of  Basic  Technical 
Characteristics  (ETC) 
audit  of  accounts 
item  counting  and  identification 
measurement  and  sampling 
- weighing 
non-destructive assay  (NDA) 
sample  taking  for  destructive 
assay  (DA) 
participation  in calibration 
exercises of  equipment 
appropriate measurements  (NDA 
and/or  DA)  on  a  low  sampling 
basis 
Type(s)  of  installation 
all types 
all types 
all types 
- research laboratories,  research 
reactors  & critical assemblies 
- concentration,  conversion 
- enrichment,  fabrication  and 
reprocessing plants 
- (certain)  power  reactors 
- (certain)  storage installations 
- others 
- research  laboratories,  research 
reactors  & crit.  assemblies 
- concentration,  conversion 
- enrichment,  fabrication  and 
reprocessing plants 
- power  reactors 
- storage installations 
- research laboratories 
- concentration,  conversion 
- enrichment,  fabrication  and 
reprocessing plants 
- storage installations 
- research  laboratories 
- concentration,  conversion 
- enrichment,  fabrication  and 
reprocessing plants 
- storage installations 
- LOF  etc. Chapter  II 
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Table  II.4 
Verification technique 
containment,  surveillance 
and  monitoring 
- seals 
camera/video  surveillance 
independent monitoring of  key 
data  (tank  levels, 
temperatures  and  other 
operator data) 
following detailed process 
operations  and  flows  within 
the plant 
monitoring/logging systems 
(cont.) 
Type(s)  of  installation 
- research  laboratories,  research 
reactors  & critical assemblies 
- concentration,  conversion 
- enrichment,  fabrication  and 
reprocessing  plants 
- power  reactors 
- storage  installations 
- research  laboratories, 
res.  reactors  & crit.  assemblies 
- enrichment,  fabrication  and 
reprocessing plants 
- power  reactors 
- storage  installations 
- enrichment 
- fabrication plants 
- reprocessing plants 
- fabrication plants 
- reprocessing plants 
- enrichment plants 
- power  reactors 
- research reactors  & critical 
assemblies 
- reprocessing plants 
- storage installations Chapter  II 
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Table  II. 5 
Typical  inspection effort per type of  installation 
Type  of  installation 
Research  laboratories 
Research  reactors  & critical 
assemblies 
Mines  and  concentration plants 
Enrichment  plants 
Conversion  and  fabrication 
(uranium natural,  LEU) 
Conversion  and  fabrication 
(HEU  and  MOX) 
Reprocessing 
Power  reactors 
Storage  installations 
Other 
Typical  frequency  of 
inspection ranging 
From  To 
1/a 
2/a 
0/a 
12/a 
12/a 
12/a 
12/a 
(when  not 
operating) 
2/a 
1/a 
0*) 
1988 
12/a  366 
6/a  368 
2/a  14 
1/week  678 
1/week  977 
continuous  1424 
continuous  1705 
24/a  879 
daily  849 
4/a  104 
7367 
Inspection effort 
- man-days  Euratom 
1989  1990 
439  313 
385  342 
21  12 
655  677 
1105  1102 
1350  1322 
1771  2275 
1060  921 
516  537 
115  63 
7417  7564 
*)  Holders  of  small  amounts  of  depleted  and  natural  uranium  or  thorium 
used  for  non-nuclear purposes  are  inspected on  a  sampling basis or when 
discrepancies  following  declarations  (also  from  other  operators)  need 
to be  resolved. 
. ' COUNTRY 
BELGIUM 
DENMARK 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
SPAIN 
FRANCE 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
LUXEMBOURG 
Chapter  II 
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Table  II.  6 
Cumulated  Inspection Effort per  Country 
(Expressed  in mandays  /  year  and  ~) 
Mandays  Mandays  ~ 
1989  1990  1990 
594  627  8,3 
21  18  0,24 
2237  2170*)  28,7*) 
6  4  0,05 
170  147  1,9 
2013  2408  31,8 
2  2  0,03 
165  155  2,1 
0  0  0 
THE  NETHERLANDS  137  129  1,7 
PORTUGAL  7  6  0,08 
UNITED  KINGDOM  1967  1812  24,0 
COM  98  86  1,1 
TOTAL  7417  7564  100,0 
*)  Including effort  spent  in the  new  "Bundeslaender"  after German 
unification  on  03.10.90. Chapter  II 
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36.  In  relation to tables  II.5  and  II.6 it may  be  noted  that  the  frequency 
and  intensity  of  inspections  are  also  influenced  by  the  established 
quantified  inspection  goals  which  depend  on  the  strategic  value, 
amounts  and  types  of  nuclear  material,  on  the  probabilities  of 
detection  and  the  detection  times.  These  quantified  inspect  ion  goals 
are  reviewed  from  time  to  time  so  as  to  take  account  of  new  safeguards 
concepts  and  of the progress  in research  and  development. 
37.  The  safeguards  approaches  for  "mixed"  MBA's  {see  para.  20)  differ  from 
those  applied elsewhere  in respect  of their objective: 
For  installations handling civil material exclusively the objective 
set out  in Article  77  of the Treaty applies to all nuclear material 
in  inventory or'throughputll. 
For  installations  handling  or  storing civil  and  non-civil  material 
simultaneously  or  sequentially  the  objective  set  out  in Article  77 
of  the  Treaty  applies  equally  to  this  civil  material,  a  key 
condition  being  that  there  should  be  no  net  loss  in  quantity  and 
quality of  the civil material  in  a  plant. 
38.  Whenever  discrepancies are detected: 
within the operator's  accounting  system 
between  two  operators 
between operator's records,  reports  and  inspection  findings 
they  are  followed  up  immediately.  Anomalies  are  unresolved 
discrepancies  or  prima  facie  evidence  of  an  irregularity discovered  as 
a  result  of  records/reports  examination  or  other  inspection activities 
which  may  lead  to  the  belief  that  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  or  other 
legal  instruments  have  not  been  respected.  The  resolution  of  anomalies 
requires  a  sequence  of  actions  normally  additional  to  the  safeguards 
measures  indicated  in  table  II.  4.  Anomalies  once  fully  established, 
i.e.  unresolvable,  would  be  considered  by  the  Commission  as  a  presumed 
infringement of the Treaty. 
1)  Plus,  where  applicable,  to the  equipment. Chapter  II 
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Safeguards  approaches  and  implementation  - Findings 
39.  The  following  paragraphs  of  this  chapter  provide  findings  resulting 
from  the  application of the  safeguards measures  in  1989  and  1990. 
40.  Upon  German  unification  on  3  October  1990,  Euratom  responsibility  for 
safeguards  extended to all nuclear material at the installations in the 
new  "Bundesl~nder".  Prior  to  this  date  a  task  force  was  established 
and  there  was  a  series  of  visits  by  specialists  in 
accounting/reporting,  operations  and  health  physics  to  the  former 
German  Democratic  Republic  (GDR}.  Furthermore,  a  seminar  for  all 
operators  was  organized  in  September  1990  to  prepare  for  the 
implementation of  Euratom  Safeguards.  There  were  also consultations at 
various  levels  with  the  IAEA  and  with  representatives  of  both  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  of  the  former  GDR  to  ensure  a  smooth 
transition  (in  the  application  of  IAEA  safeguards)  from  the  GDR/IAEA 
agreement  to  the  Euratom  (10  NNWS)l}/IAEA  agreement.  Preparation  and 
consultation  on  the  Particular  Safeguard  Provisions  (PSP)  and  the 
Facility  Attachments  (FA)  commenced  in  1990  and  should  be  finished  in 
1992. 
41.  The  first  inspection  in  the  new  "Bundesl~nder" took  place  on  4  October 
1990.  The  application  of  Euratom  safeguards  at  the  nuclear  power 
stations  and  at  the  intermediate  irradiated  fuel  store  in  the  new 
"Bundesl~nder"  has  been  progressively  implemented.  Before  the  end  of 
1990  all  the  inventories  at  the  above  installations  were  either 
verified or,  where  operational  conditions  did  not  permit,  "frozen"  for 
verification  at  a  later  stage.  In  addition,  Euratom 
containment/surveillance  equipment  had  been  installed  and  was 
operational.  Relating  to  the  research  centers  and  research  reactors 
the  necessary  initial  and  routine  inspections  were  performed  and 
important  discrepancies  between  the  book  stocks  and  the  physical 
reality  were  detected.  The  appropriate  follow-up  actions  by  Euratom 
resulted  in explanations  for  these  discrepancies  and  in  the  correction 
of  the  books  and  declarations  where  appropriate.  It  is  expected  that 
these  follow-up activities can be  finalized  in 1991. 
Relating  to  the  installations  comprising  small  amounts  of  nuclear 
material  and  to  Uranium  mines  and  concentration  plants  the  application 
of  Euratom  safeguards  commenced  in  1990  with  the  aim  to  have  Community 
standards  applied  by  1992. 
1)  Non  Nuclear  Weapons  States Chapter II 
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Research  laboratories,  research reactors  & critical assemblies 
42.  The  safeguards measures  applied at these  installations are described  in 
table II.4,  the  inspection effort  spent  is described  in table II.S. 
43.  Following  the  reports  of  the  inspectors,  69 
inspection  or  separate  communications  were 
particular observations  requiring  follow-up. 
{  14%)  statements  after 
dispatched  containing 
44.  These  communications  and  direct 
government  authorities  aim  at 
implementation  relating,  inter alia, 
consultations  with 
further  improving 
to: 
operators  or 
safeguards 
the  promptness  and  correctness of records  and  declarations; 
the  inventories  of  difficult to access  nuclear materials; 
the  de£ inition  of  safeguards  measures  to  be  applied  to  nuclear 
materials  contained  in wastes  and  discards. 
Mines  and  concentration plants 
45.  The  safeguards  measures  applied at these installations are described  in 
table II.4 and  the  inspection effort spent  is described  in table II.S. 
46.  Following  the  reports  of  the  inspectors,  8 
inspection  or  separate  communications  were 
particular observations requiring  follow-up. 
Enrichment  plants 
{47%)  statements  after 
dispatched .  containing 
47.  The  safeguards  measures  applied at these  installations are described  in 
table II.4,  the  inspection effort spent  is described in table II.S. 
48.  Following  the  reports  of  the  inspectors,  29 
inspection  or  separate  communications  was 
particular observations requiring  follow-up. 
{12%)  statement  after 
dispatched  containing 
49.  In  relation to centrifuge enrichment plants it may  be  noted: 
49.A.  In  1983  an  international  project,  referred  to  as  the  Hexa-
partite  Safeguards  Project,  provided  recommendations  on  how 
commercial  centrifuge  enrichment  plants  should  be  safeguarded 
while  minimizing  the  risk  of  dissemination  of  sensitive 
technology. 49.8. 
49.C. 
Chapter  II 
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These  recommendations  to  the  IAEA  included,  apart  from  the 
"classical"  safeguards  measures  listed  in  table  II.  4  above, 
"Limited  Frequency  Unannounced  Access"  ( LFUA)  to  the  cascade 
areas  during  which  inspectors  can  satisfy themselves  that  the 
plants  are  operating  as  declared  by  the  operator.  Euratom 
observes  these  recommendations  for  the  inspections  conducted 
together with the  IAEA.  As  to the  inspections  in the  enrichment 
plant  in  which  the  Commission  operates  alone,  these 
recommendations  are  applied as  adjusted to the particular plant 
design. 
In  1990  Euratom  was  informed  that  significant  changes  in  the 
enrichment  technology  were  about  to  take  place  requiring 
adaptations  of  the  safeguards  approaches  for  such  plants.  The 
necessary  consultations  with  plant  operators,  government 
authorities  and  the  IAEA  have  been  initiated and  continue. 
50.  The  above  mentioned  communications  and  consultations  with  operators  or 
government  authorities  continue,  thus,  in  order  to  further  improve 
safeguards  implementation relating,  inter alia,  to: 
the  use  of  non-destructive  inspection  instruments  inside  the 
cascade  area  and  the  application  of  Containment  and  Surveillance 
(C/S)  devices; 
further  improvement  of  the  Non  Destructive 
measurements  for  the depleted uranium tails; 
Assay  (NDA) 
measures  to  verify  conclusively that there  has  been  no  net  loss  of 
civil material  in certain installations relating,  in particular,  to 
procedures  for  the taking of the physical  inventory. Chapter  II 
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Conversion  plants,  fuel  preparation plants  and  fabrication plants 
processing natural  uranium  and/or  low  enriched uranium 
51.  The  safeguards measures  applied at these  installations are described  in 
table !!.4,  the  inspection effort spent  is described  in table !!.3. 
52.  Following  the  reports  of  the  inspectors,  16 
inspection  or  separate  communications  were 
particular observations requiring  follow-up. 
(8\)  statements  after 
dispatched  containing 
consultations  with  operators  or 
further  improving  safeguards 
53.  These  communications  and  direct 
government  authorities  aim  at 
implementation relating,  inter alia,  to: 
53.A. 
53.8. 
Take  account  of  certain  technological  developments  which  have 
strongly  influenced  the  safeguards  activities  at  these 
facilities,  e.g.  the  availability  of  modern  instrumentation 
based  on  neutron  and/or  gamma  techniques.  These  modern 
instruments  are  being progressively  introduced  in the field  and 
will  lead to more  effective safeguards. 
Testing  and  implementation  of  inspection  schemes  providing  for 
random  and/or  short  notice  inspections. 
54.  In  application  of  Article  83.c  of  the  Treaty  one  fabrication 
installation was  placed under  Commission  administration during  1990  for 
a  period  of  four  months  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  operator  would 
establish  and  perform  the  proper  procedures  relating  to  material 
accountancy,  control  and  to  declarations.  The  Commission  had  imposed 
this sanction  following  an  export of  low  enriched  Uranium  in containers 
recorded  and  handled  as  empty.  The  action  was  successfully terminated 
at  the  end  of  1990  following  the  verification  by  the  administrators 
that  appropriate  procedures  had  been  developed,  established  and  fully 
implemented  in the plant operation. Chapter  II 
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Conversion/fabrication plants processing highly enriched  uranium  and/or 
plutonium 
55.  The  safeguards  measures  applied at these  installations are described  in 
table  II.4,  the  inspection effort  spent  is described  in  table  II.5.  It 
should  be  noted  that  for  these  installations  the  safeguards  approach 
usually results in  a  continuous  inspection regime. 
56.  Following  the  reports  of  the  inspectors,  24 
inspection  or  separate  communications  were 
particular observations  requiring  follow-up. 
(8~)  statements  after 
dispatched  containing 
57.  These  communications  and  direct 
government  authorities  aim  at 
implementation relating,  inter alia, 
consultations  with 
further  improving 
to: 
operators  or 
safeguards 
57.A. 
57.8. 
57.C. 
57.0. 
57.E. 
57.F. 
the  further  refinement  of  modern 
the  follow-up  and  balancing  of 
respect to reducing  the  high cost 
safeguards  approaches  such  as 
mixes  (FBOM),  notably  with 
of  safeguards  implementation; 
the  testing  and  implementation  of  further  advanced  safeguards 
approaches; 
comprehensive  verification  measurements 
instrumentation  such  as  unattended  measuring 
advanced  C/S  equipment; 
physical  inventory taking procedures; 
by  modern 
stations  and 
progressive  resolution  of  issues  related  to  the  "mixed" 
character of  certain plants; 
replacement  of  a  large  number  of  transports  of  samples  by  on-
site analysis. Chapter  II 
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Reprocessing plants 
58.  The  safeguards measures  applied at these  installations are described  in 
table  II.4,  the  inspection effort  spent  is described  in table  II.S.  It 
should  be  noted  that  for  these  installations  the  safeguards  approach 
usually  results  in  a  continuous  inspection  regime  during  the  operation 
of the installations. 
59.  Following  the  reports  of  the  inspectors,  48  (42\)  statements  after 
inspection  or  separate  communications  were  dispatched  containing 
particular observations  requiring  follow-up. 
60.  These  communications  and  direct  consultations  with  operators  or 
government  authorities  aim  at  further  improving  safeguards 
implementation relating,  inter alia,  to: 
60.A. 
60.B. 
60.C. 
60.0. 
60.E. 
Fully transparent records/reports  systems; 
In-process monitoring  and/or  C/S  applications; 
Comprehensive 
instrumentation; 
verification  measurements  by  modern 
Progressive  resolution  of  issues  related  to  the  "mixed" 
character of  certain plants; 
Replacement  of  a  large  number  of  transports  of  samples  by  on-
site analysis. 
61.  As  referred to  in para.  30  above  the main  developments  in  1989  and  1990 
related  to  the  preparations  for  and  the  coming  on  stream  of  three 
reprocessing  plants  of  large  throughput  and  complexity.  This 
entailed: 
61.A. 
61. B. 
6l.C. 
61.0. 
61.E. 
61. F. 
Obtaining  detailed  technical  characteristics, 
drawings,  flow-sheets,  process  parameters etc. 
Development  of  relevant  safeguards  approaches; 
Intensive  consultations 
authorities; 
with  operators  and 
of  detailed 
government 
Working  out  of  relevant  specifications  and  planning  of 
contracts  for  the  safeguards  system to be  installed; 
Verification of  BTC  and  of  tank calibration prior to start up; 
Commencement  of  BTC  verification  (for one plant in construction 
stage); 
j 61.G. 
6l.H. 
61. I. 
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Preparation  for  final  Commission  approval  under Article  78.2  of 
the  Treaty  (for  one plant); 
Commission  interim  approval  under  Article  78.2  of  the  Treaty 
(for one  plant); 
Implementation  of  safeguards  at  one  plant  following  the  start-
up thereof. 
62.  Apart  from  the problems  due  to the unprecedented  complexity of  such  new 
plants,  the  activities  reported  in  para.  61  above  for  the  new 
reprocessing plants  do  not  give rise to particular observations. 
Power  reactors  and  storage installations 
63.  The  safeguards  measures  applied at these  installations are described  in 
table  II.4,  the  inspection effort spent  is described  in table II.5. 
64.  Following  the  reports  of  the  inspectors,  61 
inspection  or  separate  communications  were 
particular observations  requiring  follow-up. 
(5%)  statements  after 
dispatched  containing 
65.  These  communications  and  direct 
government  authorities  aim  at 
implementation relating,  inter alia, 
consultations  with  operators  or 
further  improving  safeguards 
to: 
65 .A. 
65.8. 
65.C. 
65.0. 
Step  by  step  replacement  of  film  cameras  by  modern  video 
equipment; 
Introduction,  where  applicable,  of  monitoring  and  logging 
systems; 
Re-measurement  of  nuclear materials  under effective containment 
and  surveillance  systems; 
Introduction  of  NDA  measurements  on  fresh  fuel  stored  under 
water. 
66.  It  should  be  reported  that  during  1989  and  1990  considerable  resources 
in  terms  of  both  equipment  and  manpower  were  invested  in  applying 
safeguards  in  light  water  reactors  using  fresh  MOX  fuel.  The 
inspection  scheme  involves  using  containment/surveillance  (C/S) 
equipment  to the  maximum  extent,  however  the  inspection  manpower  spent 
is still too  high.  Efforts  to  further  improve  the  C/S  equipment  with 
the  aim  of  achieving  a  better  balance  between  equipment  and  manpower 
are  ongoing. Chapter  II 
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Locations  outside facilities  (LOF)  and  other installations 
67.  The  safeguards measures  applied at these  installations are described  in 
table II.4,  the  inspection effort spent  is described  in table II.S. 
68.  At  such  installations  which  include  those  where  uranium  or  thorium  is 
being  used  for  non-nuclear  purposes  (e.g.  shielding,  aircraft  counter 
weights,  production  of  lamps,  catalysts,  ceramics)  and  those 
installations  at  the  backend  of  the  fuel  cycle  (not  including,  of 
course,  reprocessing),  safeguards,  in specific  instances,  may  rely more 
on  the  verification  of  Basic  Technical  Characteristics  (BTC),  than  on 
other  concepts.  The  discussion,  however,  to  which  intensity  such 
measures  are  to  be  performed  has  not  yet  been  concluded  but 
considerable  progress  was  achieved  in  so  far as: 
the  coverage,  at  least  accounting-wise,  of  such  installations  has 
been  further extended; 
discussions with  government  authorities have  resulted  in the design 
of  a  scheme  which  will  take  full  advantage  of the existing  systems 
at national  level thereby saving  Euratom resources  in line with the 
subsidiarity principle  . 
. 69.  On  the  other  hand,  it  should  be  mentioned  that  at  these  installations 
operators  frequently  are  not  aware  of  their  safeguards  obligations, 
including  nuclear  materials  accounting.  This  is  why  Euratom  .continues 
to  spend  a  considerable  effort  in  administration  and  other  follow-up 
measures  to  ensure  full  adherence  to  the  legal  requirements.  This 
resulted  in  35  %  (21\  in  1988)  of  the  communications  to  operators  of 
such  installations requiring  follow-up. 
70.  As  far  as  waste treatment  and  disposal  installations are  concerned,  the 
discussions  on the implementation of.relevant  safeguards techniques to 
be  applied  are still ongoing. Chapter III 
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III.  ACCOUNTANCY 
General 
71.  Following  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  and  Regulation  3227/76,  a 
nuclear  material  accounting  system  is established at  all  installations 
as  described  above.  Reports  are  submitted  according  to  the  legal 
provisions  to  the  Euratom  Safeguards  Directorate  (DCS).  Where 
appropriate,  and  following  processing  by  Euratom,  accounting  reports 
are  submitted to the  IAEA,  pursuant to the Verification Agreements. 
72.  At  the  installations  the  nuclear  material  accounting  system  comprises 
the  records  and  reports  required  in  Regulation  3227/76  and  in  the 
Particular  Safeguard  Provisions.  These  records  must  be  complete, 
consistent  with  each  other  and  with  the  physical  reality,  and  must  be 
reflected  in  the  reports  provided  to  DCS  headquarters.  Relating  to 
these  accounting  reports  the  following  table  provides  the  number  of 
records transmitted  to DCS. 
Records  providing  for  Records  providing  for 
Year  Inventory Changes  Physical  Inventories  Total 
and material balances 
1988  213  958  207  240  421  198 
1989  204  668  201  322  405  990 
1990  297  435  285  193  582  628 
The  audits  of  these  operation  declarations  are  carried  out  during 
inspections  to  check  the  above,  and  any  remarks  arising  are  aqdrese~d 
to the  operators  and  followed  up  for  actions.  A particularly important 
task  is  the  physical  inventory  exercise  where  the  books  and  physical 
inventories  are  verified,  compared  and  any  difference  identified  and 
investigated. Chapter  II 
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73.  The  activities at ocs  headquarters  comprise the  independent  updating of 
accounts  by  installation  based  on  the  reports  received  pursuant  to 
Regulation  3227/76,  consistency  checks  between  inspection  findings  and 
accountancy  reports  provided  by  the  operators,  control  of  external 
obligations  and transit accountancy. 
Accounting  system 
74.  The  accounting  system  for  nuclear  material  follows  the  classical  rules 
of  bookkeeping  with  respect  to  the  nuclear materials  under  safeguards, 
the  basic  objective  being  that  at  all  times  the  book  inventories 
reflect the physical reality as  closely as  possible  in terms  of  amounts 
and  timing. 
75.  All  nuclear  material  accounting  systems  must  provide  for  periodic 
exercises  to  take  and  verify  the  physical  inventory.  The  frequency 
depends  on  the detection times  which  in themselves  depend  on  the nature 
and  amounts  of  materials  involved  in  the  flows  and  inventory  in  the 
installation.  The  normal  frequency  for  "wash-out"  type  of  inventory 
takings  is  once  per  year  whereas  the  time  interval  of  "snapshots"  of 
the physical  inventory  in large plutonium plants may  be  as  short  as  2-4 
weeks.  The  timing  may  depend  on  operational  constraints.  The  objective 
of  the exercise is to  compare  the physical  and  book situations  and  make 
adjustments  as  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  books  continue  to  reflect 
the  reality  as  closely  as  possible.  Each  exercise  leads  to  an 
evaluation  to  assess  the  acceptability  of  any  book/physical  inventory 
difference  in relation to the activities performed. 
76.  The  comparison  between  inspection  findings  and  records/reports  for 
activities  between  physical  inventories  is  a  further  important  element 
of  the  chain which  leads  to the  decision whether  or  not  the operator's 
accounts  can  be  accepted  by  the  safeguards  inspectors  or  whether 
follow-up  within  the  appropriate  time  intervals  has  to  be  performed. 
The  necessity  for  such  follow-up  is  frequent  and  requires  in  certain 
cases  long  term  follow  up activities until  a  satisfactory resolution of 
the  discrepancies  is established. 
External obligations 
77.  The  control  of  external obligations  is  a  further  check,  concerning the 
adherence  to  the  provisions  of  the  Community's  nuclear  agreements  with 
the  USA,  Canada  and  Australia  and/or  to  the  contractual  provisions 
requiring  peaceful  use  only.  The  checks  are  based  on  accountancy 
tracking  by  obligation  (sometimes  referred  to  as  flag  control)  and 
encompass  particular  exports  and  imports  and  preparation  of  annual 
reports  (balance  sheets)  as  required  for  the  third  States.  Important 
items  are  the  administrative  procedures  and  inspection  activities 
related  to  approval  and  follow-up  of  exchanges  of  safeguarding 
obligations. Chapter  III 
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78.  All  such exchanges  of  safeguarding obligations are  approved  and  carried 
out  ac~ording to  a  set  of  technical  criteria which  guarantee  that  only 
equiva~ent amounts  of  nuclear materials  are exchanged.  Equivalence  must 
be  ob~ained  on  the  level  of  physical  form,  on  the  total  element  and 
isotopps  involved.  A  condition  of  performing  any  exchange  of 
safegu~rding obligations  is that the  obligation  involved  with  the  most 
string~nt constraints shall not  lose  in quality or quantity. 
79.  International  "flag  swaps"  are  exchanges  of  safeguarding  obligations 
where  one  quantity of material is located outside the Community  and  the 
other  inside.  During  the  1989  - 1990  period,  no  such  exchanges  were 
performed.  A  reluctance  to  permit  such  flag  swaps  on  the  part  of  some 
supplier  countries  has  been  experienced  since  in  some  cases  there  was 
some  confusion  between  safeguarding  obligation  and  physical  origin  of 
the  nuclear  material.  Origin  is  not  tracked  by  DCS  as  it  is  not  a 
concept  relevant  to  safeguards  since,  inter  alia,  origin  of  nuclear 
material  can  no  longer  be  verified  after  the  material  has  entered  the 
fuel  cycle. 
80.  Internal  "flag  swaps"  are  exchanges  of  safeguarding  obligations  where 
quantities  of  nuclear  material  exchanged  are  subject  to  Euratom 
safeguards. 
The  following table gives  the data on  internal  flag  swaps: 
Year  Applications  Approved  Not-approved  Withdrawn 
1988  33  25  3  5 
1989  27  24  1  2 
1990  36  34  0  2 
81.  As  regards  problems  with  respect  to  certain parts  of  Chapter  VI  of  the 
Treaty,  the  role  of  Euratom  safeguards  is restricted to monitoring  and 
reporting. Chapter  III 
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Transit  accounting 
82.  In  the  Euratom  system,  receivers  are  obliged  to  report  movements  in 
exactly  the  same  way  as  the  shipper.  Transit  accounting  is  the  cross 
check at  the  level  of  the  reports  received  from  operators that  in fact 
the  nuclear  materials  are  reported  as  having  been  received  as  shipped. 
As  far  as  shipments  and  receipt·s  inside  the  European  Community  are 
concerned,  the  Safeguards  Directorate  follows  up  each  transfer 
automatically  until  the  official  confirmation  of  the  receipt  is 
available.  This  may  involve physical verifications,  and  any discrepancy 
between  shipper  reports  and  receiver  reports  automatically  triggers  a 
follow-up  action  which  may  lead  to  an  anomaly.  All  discrepancies  must 
be  resolved  or  justified.  If  justified,  the  receiver  is  nevertheless 
obliged  to  report  the  movement  in  the  same  way  as  the  shipper 
accompanied  by  an  appropriate  shipper-receiver difference report. 
83.  The  response  time  of  the  Euratom  safeguards  system to  such  differences 
in  reports  on  transit  is .less  than  a  month  for  plutonium  and  highly 
enriched  uranium.  This  detection  mechanism  of  diversions  is  of 
fundamental  importance.  It  may  be  reported  that  in  1989  and  1990  all 
open  transit  differences  were  resolved  after  appropriate  follow-up 
action. 
84.  A  further  feature of this activity is the contribution to the worldwide 
IAEA  system  of  nuclear  material  control.  The  Community  record  has 
always  been  good  in this  respect  and  this exercise  has  allowed  Euratom 
to  observe  that  certain  countries  outside  the  Community  do  not  report 
on  time  or  with  the  necessary  precision.  The  Commission  continues  to 
help  the  IAEA  in solving problems  of this type. 
Concluding  remark 
85.  The  above  controls  and  audits  provide  the  necessary  verifications 
whether  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  the  agreements 
with  third  country  suppliers  and  the  safeguards  agreements  with  IAEA 
are  being  complied  with.  As  regards  accountancy  of  safeguards 
obligations,  balance  sheets  and  exchanges  of  safeguarding  obligations, 
no  particular  observations  apply  for  the  period  considered  in  this 
report.  The  usual  follow-up  required  in the cases  of  late submission of 
reports,  incomplete  records  and  reports  and/or  of  discrepancies  took 
place. Year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
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lV.  RESOURCES 
Inspection manpower  resources 
86.  The  development  of  the  staff  of  the  Euratom  Safeguards  Directorate  is 
displayed  in  the  following  table  IV .1.  This  table  also  displays  the 
inspection  effort  spent  and  the  amounts  of  nuclear  material  under 
safeguards. 
Table  IV.l 
Operational  Inspection  Nuclear  material 
Staff  ocs  inspectors  mandays  under  safeguards 
spent  in eff.  kg 
Index  Index  Index  (by  1000)  Index 
179  100  108  100  4  489  100  78  100 
180  101  120  111  5  116  114  90  115 
177  99  131  121  6  047  135  105  134 
188  105  125  116  6  225  139  121  155 
202  113  134  124  6  196  138  139  177 
212  118  139  129  6  814  152  158  202 
228  127  155  144  7  364  164  179  229 
~ 
230  128  157  145  7  417  165  199  255 
227  127  163  151  7  564  169  231  296 
87.  The  following  additional  remarks  should  be  taken  into  account  when 
considering table IV.l: 
87.A.  Inspection  effort  is  calculated  through  an  internationally 
accepted  definition  (reference  for  example:  Art.  98  L  of  the 
Verification Agreement),  i.e.  " ...  a  man-day  being  a  day  during 
which  a  single  inspector  has  access  to  a  facility  at  any  time 
for  a  total of  not  more  than eight  hours". Chapter  IV 
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87.8.  In  addition to the  inspection effort  spent  by  Euratom,  the  IAEA 
spent  the  following  inspection effort in the Community: 
year  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
man-days  of 
inspection  in  2781  2545  3070  3442  3854  3591  3565  3615 
the  Community 
87.C.  The  increase 
dominated  by 
safeguards  is 
(in  effective  kg)  of  nuclear  materials  is 
plutonium.  Currently  most  plutonium  under 
in  store  either  in  the  form  of  irradiated  fuel 
awaiting reprocessing or  in oxide  form  in containers. 
88.  While  it  would  be  misleading  to  link  safeguards  effectiveness 
exclusively to  inspection effort spent  it is  nevertheless  a  fact  that 
the  increase  in  nuclear  materials  has  been  accompanied  by  an  increase 
in  inspection  manpower  and  by  an  increase  in  the  average 
"productivity"  of the inspectors. 
Inspection manpower  resources until  1995 
89.  In  view  of  the  continuing  increase  in  the  number  of  nuclear 
installations  within  the  European  Community  and,  in  particular,  the 
corresponding  increase  of  civil  nuclear  material  to  be  safeguarded, 
the  need  should  be  recognized  to  continue  to  augment  the  number  of 
nuclear  safeguards  inspectors within the years to  come. 
90.  More  specifically,  the  reasons  for  the  additional  manpower 
requirements  are: 
90.A.  To  meet  the  challenge  posed  by  three  large  reprocessing  plants 
and· two  large  MOX  fabrication  plants,  unprecedented  in  scale 
scheduled  to  start  operations  between  1989  and  1993  (One  such 
plant started in  1989). 
90.8.  To  ensure  that the  safeguards  coverage will  keep  pace 
growth  of  the  nuclear  industry  in  the  Community 
particular  with  the  increasing  use  of  plutonium  in 
nuclear electricity generation purposes; 
with the 
and  in 
MOX  for 
90.C.  To  further  improve  safeguards  at  complex  installations, 
particularly  at  installations  where  both  civil  and  non-civil 
nuclear  material  are  handled  either  simultaneously  or 
sequentially. Chapter  IV 
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91.  Accordingly,  the  Commission  informed  the  Council  in  1989  that  a  total 
of  99  inspection posts  will  be  needed  in  the  period to  31.12.1995.  It 
should  be  noted  that  it  is  necessary  to  recruit  persona  with  a 
suitable  technical  background,  i.e.  with  a  degree  from  university  or 
an  advanced  technical  school  combined  with  experience  gained  in  the 
nuclear  field.  On  the  other  hand,  any  newly  recruited  inspector 
needs  specific training  and  must  undergo  a  security enquiry  in all the 
Member  States;  this  implies  that  an  inspector  becomes  operational 
after about  one  year. 
Operational credits 
92.  Budget  chapter  B4. 2  provides  the  credits  for  the  operation  of  Eura·tom 
safeguards  excluding  staff  coat  and  excluding  coat  for  the  computer 
main  frames: 
92.A.  Budget  line  B4  2000:  missions 
92.B.  Budget  line  B4  2010:  training,  meetings  and  experts 
92.C.  Budget  line  B4  2020:  procurement  of  instruments,  sample 
analysis  transport,  temporary  staff, 
technical  and  scientific  studies, 
informatics  software  and  Pes. 
92.0.  Budget  line  B4  2021:  large  plutonium  processing  plants.  The 
Commission  has  introduced this budget  line 
in  view  of  the  significant  investments 
necessary.  (Ref.  para.  30-34  above). 
In  addition,  budget  line  AO  1420  provides  for  coats  associated  with 
radioprotection of  inspectors. 
93.  The  following  credits  were  made  available  over  the  last  five  years 
(in MECU): 
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
84  2000  1,910  2,010  2,100  2,250  2,350 
84  2010  0,130  0,130  0,130  0,120  0,105 
B4  2020  2,051  2,060  2,500  3,800  2,300 
B4  2021  I  I  I  I  2,600 
Total  4,091  4,200  4,730  6,170  7,355 
AO  1420  0,052  0,065  0,114  0,155  0,140 
consumed  resources  95,12  93,77  99,81  99,99  --
(t) Chapter  IV 
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Instruments,  methods  and  techniques 
94.  The  Safeguards  Directorate  at  present  possesses  the  following 
equipment  used either at nuclear  installations or  at headquarters. 
A.  Gamma  equipment 
EURATOM  EQUIPMENT  12/90 
B.  Neutron  equipment 
1 
7 
10 
2 
6 
24 
7 
4 
2 
2 
1 
NIS  PITMAN  }  hand  held 
HM4  }  syst. 
SAM  II  (2  channel  syst.) 
Enrichment  meters 
Pu  meters 
Davidson  MCA's 
Silena Ciceros 
Gamma  & Neutron 
Measurement  stations 
MTR  scanners 
5-10  Canberras 
5-1500  Canberras 
c.  C/S  equipment 
86 
6 
14 
21 
19 
10 
1 
I 
Minolta camera units 
Ministar  TV  systems 
MIVS  TV  systems 
EUR  video  systems  (TLR) 
VACOSS  seals 
Night  vision devices 
Pebble  sampling device 
2  SAM  II/  SNAP 
4  Cercueil  (pins) 
1  Octagon  (waste) 
13  HLNCC  (Pu) 
7  NCC  (fuel  elements) 
5  AWCC  (HEU,  LEU) 
5  Phonid  (LEU,  HEU) 
3  CIND  (UF6  cy1.) 
4  UFBR  (FBR  ass.,  Pu  cyl.) 
4  Inventory  sample  counter 
1  Sigma  (THTR  pebbles) 
6  Hexagones 
D.  "other"  equipment 
6  ION-1  FORK  (spent  fuel) 
1  UF6  mass  spectrometer 
1  U02  mass  spectrometer 
1  Potentiometer  (U-factor) 
Various  reference materials 
11  Ultrasonic  thickness  gauges 
11  Load  cells 
1  Portable K-edge 
1  K-edge  densitometer 
Total:  about  310  INSTRUMENTS  at the end  of  1990  - (250  end of  1988) 
95.  The  application  of  technical  measures  for  nuclear  materials 
verification  and  containment/surveillance  has  largely  increased  over 
the  last  few  years.  This  is  illustrated  in  Fig.  1  attached  for  the 
years  1984  to  1990.  The  figures  show  (in  percent)  the  number  of 
inspections where  sample  taking,  optical surveillance,  non destructive 
assay  (NDA)  or use of  seals is involved. 
96.  The  use  of  technical  measures  per type  of  installation is illustrated 
in  Figs.  2-5  for  NDA  equipment  (Fig.  2),  optical  surveillance  (Fig. 
3),  sample  taking  (Fig.  4)  and  use  of  seals  (Fig.  5).  The  figures  are 
self-explanatory. Chapter  IV 
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97.  787  and  882  samples  were  taken  by  inspectors  in  the  field  in  1989  and 
1990  respectively.  215  and  359  samples  were  analysed  on  site  using 
analytical  equipment  or  our  portable  mass  spectrometers.  397  and  497 
samples  were  transported  to  the  Commission  laboratories  at  Karlsruhe, 
Ispra  and  Geel,  where  a  total  of  1139  and  1335  chemical  analysis  were 
carried out. 
The  mean  time  for  transport  was  62  and  53  days  (140  in 1988),  the mean 
time  for  analysis  46  days  (50  days  in  1988).  The  total  delay  time  is 
decreasing but  is still unacceptably  high  . 
An  analysis  of  the  reasons  for  delay  shows  that  transportation  is  a 
significant  cause.  The  main  reason  for  these  long  transportation 
times  is  the  need  to  fully  comply  with  transport  regulations · of 
radioactive  material.  In  order  to  overcome  this  problem  and  also  for 
reasons  of  cost effectiveness,  Euratom  has  proposed to install two  on-
site laboratories at  La  Hague  (France)  and  Sellafield  (UK).  The  first 
steps  for  implementing  this  solution  at  Sellafield  (design,  safety 
aspects,  contracts, ...  )  have  already been  taken.  The  commissioning of 
this laboratory should  commence  by  1992. 
Moreover,  instruments  are  coming  into  routine  use  which  allow  the 
measurements  of  most  of  such  safeguards  samples  on  site  thereby 
reducing the  need  for transports to  a  minimum. 
98.  About  18,000 seals were  placed each year  by  inspectors during  1989  and 
1990  of  which  about  3000  seals  were  placed  each  year  on  nuclear 
materials  exported  from  the  Community.  About  14,000  and  18,000  seals 
were  removed  and  verified  in  1989  and  1990  at  headquarters.  In 
addition  about  7500  paper  seals,  and  40  new  fibre  optic  seals  were 
used  and  field tested in nuclear installations. 
99.  During  1990  (1989),  718  (803)  films  from  optical  surveillance  units 
were  developed,  reviewed  and  evaluated  at  DCS  headquarters  in 
Luxembourg.  The  reliability  of  the  optical  surveillance  units  was 
better  than  99.8%.  From  the  new  video  systems  introduced  in 
installations,  about  400  (300)  video  tapes were  replaced,  reviewed  and 
evaluated. 
100.  Equipment  for  Non  Destructive  Assay  (NDA)  was  used  for  nuclear 
material  verifications  in  almost  800  inspections  in  1989  and  1990, 
equivalent to about  37%  of the total  number  of  inspections. 
101.  Large  plant-installed  measurement 
discussed,  designed  and  installed 
and  surveillance  systems 
in  collaboration  with  the 
were 
plant 
operators  concerned  for  reprocessing  and  plutonium storage facilities. Chapter  IV 
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Informatics 
102.  The  following  main  systems  are  presently  in  operation  (apart  from  a 
multitude of  individual applications): 
103. 
102.A.  Accounting  System  (CMF  - Comptabilite  Matieres  Fissiles):  ADP 
(Automatic  Data  Processing)  and  verification  of  operator 
reports  (approximately  600.000  lines per year).  Reports  to  IAEA 
on  magnetic  tapes  based  on  operator's  reports  but  in  a 
different  format.  Production  of  numerous  reports  for 
statistical  purposes  and  for  assisting  the  accounting  unit  in 
its checks. 
102.8.  Seals:  ADP  of  approximately  18000  seals/year  from  fabrication, 
issue,  placing,  breaking,  through to final verification. 
102.c.  Destructive  Analysis:  Storage  and  retrieval  of  data,  both 
administrative  and  technical,  related to the  taking  of  samples 
for  destructive analyses. 
102.0.  Inspection  planning 
scheduling  of  each 
subset  of  the  plan. 
and  follow-up:  Input  and  storage  of  the 
inspection.  Communication  to  IAEA  of  a 
After  the  inspection,  the  system  generates 
the necessary  follow-up  actions. 
102.  E.  Management:  List  of  personnel,  management  of  missions, 
productions  of mission statistics,  presence list etc. 
102.F.  NUMSAS  (Nuclear  Material  Statistical  Analysis  System):  System 
to evaluate differences  found  in material  balances. 
Personal  computers  have  become  an  indispensable  tool  to  assist 
inspectors  in  the  field  as  well  as  ·for  purposes  of  headquarters 
evaluations.  Particular  attention  is  given  to  ensure  compatibility 
between  the  hardware  as  well  as  between  applications  at  the 
installations.  The  PCs  are  integrated  with  the  main-frame  computer 
through  a  LAN  (Local  Area  Network). 
104.  The  following  list gives  a  survey  of  the  hardware  available  and  used 
exclusively  for  safeguards: 
Siemens  7560,  1.7  mips  and  32  terminals 
2  UNIX  computers  (Olivetti  382  and  NCR600)  for  office 
automatization  including word  processing etc.  with  37  work stations 
88  personal  computers. 
1  UNIX  computer  (NCR  600)  for  access to the public packet  switching 
data  network  (x25).  Ciphered  faxes  can  be  transmitted  with  this 
network. 
2  Ciphered  faxes  to exchange  confidential documents  with the  IAEA. Chapter  IV 
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105.  Relating to software the main  components  are  the  following: 
Operating  system  BS2000  allowing  batch  and on-line processing 
Database  management  system  ADABAS  including query  language  NATU~ 
Database  management  system  dBASE  III  and  oracle,  for  the  oper~tion 
of  the  personal  computers  and  other  software  for  PC's  as  MS  WORD, 
LOTUS  123  and others. 
106.  It  is  expected  that  the  development  of  informatics  will 
further  decentralizing  hardware  while  maintaining  an 
architecture  permitting  strict  software  compatibility  and, 
assuring strict data  security. 
Support  from  the Joint Research  Center  (DG  XII-JRC) 
proceep  in 
integzrated 
of  co4rse, 
107.  DG  XII-JRC  supports  the  Euratom  safeguards  directorate  by  performing 
and  financing  a  number  of essential activities in the  R&D  field: 
107.A.  Development  of  instruments,  methods  and  techniques  as  well  as 
analysis  of  safeguards  samples:  Cost  about  3, 5  Mia  ECU  per 
annum. 
107.  B.  Radiation  protection  (dosimetry  and  expertise)  of  the 
safeguards  inspectors. 
107.C.  Training  of  safeguards  personnel  at  ISPRA,  mainly  at  the 
recently established  PERLA  laboratory. 
108.  The  support  by  DG  XII-JRC  to the safeguards directorate is coordinated 
by  a  rigorous  project  management.  The  total  number  of  such  projects 
amounted to  23  (1989)  and  38  (1990). 
109.  The  continuation  of  the 
Safeguards  Directorate  in 
essential. 
support  by  DG 
an  effective 
XII-JRC  to  the  Euratom 
and  efficient  manner  is I Fig. 1 Usage of Technical Measures I 
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V.  RELATIONS WITH  THE  INTERNATI@NAL 
110. 
111. 
112. 
ATOHIC  ENERGY  AGENCY  (I  A  E  A) 
The  IAEA,  a  member  of  the  UN  family  of  specialized agencies,  is the 
international  Agency  responsible  on  a  worldwide  basis~  inter alia, 
for  carrying  out  safeguards  under  the  Non-Proliferation  Treaty  or 
other agreements  relating to the peaceful  use of nuclear energy.  As 
already described before  (para.  I.l3)  three Verification Agreements 
have  been  concluded  between  the  Community,  its  Member  States  and 
the  IAEA.  They  establish  the  responsibilities  of  Euratom,  its 
Member  States and  the  IAEA. 
The  structure  of  the  relations  with  the  IAEA  may  be  summarized  as 
follows: 
lll.A.  Participation  of  the  IAEA  in  Euratom  inspections.  This  is  a 
daily  operational  task.  At  about  50  %  of  all  Euratom 
inspections  IAEA  inspectors participate. 
111.8.  Reporting  of  the  nuclear  material  movements  and  inventories 
pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  Verification  Agreements  and 
support  to  the  IAEA  system  of  world  wide  accounting  for  the 
transit of  nuclear materials. 
lll.C.  Meetings  of  the  Liaison  Committees  pursuant  to  Art.  25  of  the 
Protocol  to  the  Safeguards  Agreements.  The  purpose  of  these 
meetings  is 
relating to 
to  discuss,  coordinate,  negotiate  general  issues 
or  influencing  IAEA  safeguards  in the .Community. 
lll.D.  Negotiations  of  documents  of  a  technical/legal  nature  called 
the  Facility  Attachments  (F.A.)  or  installation  attachments. 
This  requires  a  major  negotiation effort  on  all sides.  Some  50 
Attachments,  including  the  attachments  for  new  installations 
and  existing attachments  in  need  of  revision,  still need  to be 
negotiated,  about  200  being  already in  force. 
lll.E.  Numerous  contacts  and  working  groups,  participation  in 
seminars,  common  training activities; 
lll.F.  Collaboration  with  the  IAEA  in  the  development,  testing  and 
implementation  of  instruments,  methods  and  techniques. 
A  number  of developments  took place  in 1989  and  1990  which  continue 
to  give  raise  to  extended  discussions  and  negotiations  on  the 
implementation of  the three Safeguards Agreements. 
• 
• .. 
• 
113. 
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These  developments  include: 
113 .A.  Due  to  the  declared  intent  of  several  countries  outside  the 
European  Community  that  they  aim  for  the  establishment  of 
"regional"  safeguards  systems  and  have,  reportedly,  indicated 
their objectives to  negotiate  for  the  same  terms  a·s  Euratom  in 
the  Verification  Agreements,  the  IAEA  is  in  a  delicate 
position,  since  notably  these  countries  in  their  actual 
negotiations  are  reported  to  link  their  acceptance  of  full 
scope  IAEA  safeguards  with  the  acceptance,  a  priori,  of  a 
regional  system.  The  political  discussion  of  "regional" 
safeguards  systems  is expected to be  relevant  for the relations 
between  the  IAEA  and  Euratom. 
113.8.  The  IAEA  has  developed  a  set  of  "Safeguards  Criteria  for  1991-
95"  and  a  document  was  officially  provided  to  Euratom  on  26 
November  1990  during  the  High  Level  Liaison  Committee  (HLLC). 
The  Commission  services  undertook  to  analyze  these  criteria 
with  respect  to  safeguards  methodology,  compliance  with  the 
Verification  Agreements  and  accompanying  understandings  (e.g  •• 
Observation  and  Joint  Teams),  compliance  with  facility 
attachments  concluded  as  well  as  with  basic  Community  policy 
such  as  on  the  unity  of  the  European  nuclear  market.  The 
analysis  of  the  criteria  was  completed  in  1991  and  the 
Commission  services  are  in  a  process  of  consultation  with  the 
IAEA  within the  framework  of the  HLLC. 
113.C.  The  experience  of  Euratom  in  the  design  and  implementation  of 
safeguards  systems  for  the  large  plutonium  processing  plants 
show  that their  features  require  a  shift  from  class.ical  human-
interference  inspections  to  fully  automated  and  largely 
unattended  systems  leading  to  concepts  and  approaches  Euratom 
considers essential to perform  high quality safeguards.  As  one 
of  these  plants will  be  jointly safeguarded  by  Euratom  and  the 
IAEA  the  negotiations  on  the  safeguards  concepts  and,  notably, 
the operations  have  not yet  led  (end  1990)  to  a  consensus. 
114.  Further  issues to be discussed with the  IAEA  include: 
114.A.  Maintenance  of  a  steady  progress  in  the  early  conclusion  of 
Facility Attachments; 
114.8.  The  implementation  of  IAEA  safeguards  in  the  Nuclear  Weapon 
States. 
114.C.  A  continual  review  of  safeguards  approaches  in  view  of 
improved  instrumentation  and  advances  in  processing 
technology,  notably,  for  large  fuel  cycle  installations 
processing Uranium. Chapter v 
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115.  It  is  clear  that  the  commission  continues  to  support  the  worldwide 
role  and, responsibilities of  the  IAEA  in the safeguards  field.  For its 
part,  the  Commission trusts the  IAEA  to maintain its relationship with 
the  Community  on  the  basis  of  the  responsibilities  laid  down  in  the 
three  Safeguards  Agreements  which  were  of  course  concluded  on  the 
basis of  Euratom Treaty obligations. 
116.  A  certain  duplication  in  the  application  of  safeguards  procedures  is 
however  unavoidable,  but: 
as  a  consequence  of  the  collaboration  between  Euratom  and  . the 
IAEA,  the effectiveness of  safeguards  in the Community  Non  Nuclear 
Weapons  States  is,  when  taken  together,  superior  to  any  other 
region  in  the  world1  as  a  typical  example  the  implementation  of 
Euratom  safeguards  for  the  new  "Laender"  of  Germany  can  be 
mentioned; 
the  IAEA  can  participate  in  the  implementation  of  the  NPT  in 
safeguarding  activities  (which  Euratom  needs  to  perform)  of  an 
intensity and  depth which it may  not  perform elsewhere. 
117.  The  Commission's  collaboration with the  IAEA  in the  safguards 
one  of  the  key  elements  in  the  consistently  high  level 
Community's  non-proliferation credentials. 
field is 
of  the 
• .. 
... 
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VI.  T  R  E  N  D  S  I  N  S  A  F  E  G  U A  R  D S  0  P  E  R  A  T  I  0  N 
118.  Safeguards  up  to  1995  can  be  characterized  both  through  the  way  it 
will  cope  with  the  increased availability  and  use  of  plutonium  in the 
commercial  fuel  cycle of  the  Community  and  through the desirability to 
continue to  improve  the effectiveness  and  efficiency of the safeguards 
operation in general. 
119.  Reference 
paragraphs 
paragraphs 
is  made  in  this  respect  to  the  trends  as  described  in 
101  to  106  of  the  Operations  Report  for  1988  as  well  as  to 
23  to  34  of the present report. 
120.  A  new  type  of  installation  is  presently  under  design  and  may  enter 
pilot  plant  stage,  i.e.  plants  to  "compact"  irradiated  LWR  fuel 
elements  for  the  purpose  of  later  "final"  disposal.  It  is  expected 
that  such  pilot  plants  might  become  operational  between  1995-2000; 
relevant  safeguards  concepts  and  approaches  are  presently  being 
discussed with operators  and  with the  IAEA. 
121.  From  a  technical point of view,  the trend reported  in paragraph  106  of 
the  "1988  Report"  can  be  confirmed  as  presenting  a  continuing 
challenge to  safeguards  in  two  respects. 
122.  For  security  and  health  physics  reasons,  installations  are  designed 
and  operated,  in  which  the  nuclear  material  which  is  subject  to 
safeguards  is  more  and  more  inaccessible  (massive  transport/storage 
containers  not  designed  for  routine  opening;  heavily  shielded,  secure 
storage of  sensitive nuclear material).  Developments  now  being applied 
include  advanced  measurement  instrumentation  and  sophisticated  C/S 
systems  including  monitoring/logging  systems  designed  to  react  to  and 
record  events  which  might  be  of  interest  to  safeguards.  These 
developments  will  need  to  be  continued  to  keep  pace  with  design 
changes  and  adapted to specific situations. 
123.  The  main  fuel  cycle  facilities,  i.e.  fabrication  and  reprocessing 
plants  are  developed  to  operate  in  a  fully  automated  (and  remotely 
controlled)  mode.  This  trend  continues  to  cause  the  departure  from 
established safeguards/inspection practice,i.e.  the need  for  Euratom  : 
to  further  increase  the  involvement  of  safeguards  experts  in  the 
design/construction work  at  a  stage  long  before  commissioning; 
to  further  increase  the  emphasis  on  the  activities  related  to 
authentication  for  safeguards  purposes  of  plant  design,  operators 
measurement  procedures  and  accounting; 
to  further  increase  the  importance  of  verification  and  re-
verification of the basic technical characteristics; 
to  continue  in  safeguards  operations  to  try  to  limit  the  need 
for  additional  manpower,  in line with the manpower  provisions  made 
by  the  Commission  (ref.  para.  91) ,  through  the  development  and 
implementation  of  automated,  largely  unattended  measurement 
systems  where  feasible. Chapter VII 
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VII. S  U  H  M A  R  Y 
124.  The  effectiveness  of  Euratom  safeguards  depends  as  outlined  in 
report  on  the  manner  in  which  the  inspection  service is  organized 
motivated,  on  the  promptness  and  the  extent  to  which  operators 
Member  State  authorities  fulfill  the  responsibilities  and  on 
resources  made  available to the Commission. 
this 
and 
and 
the 
125.  Relating  to  the  mandate,  the  intensity  and  depth  of  Euratom 
safeguards,  the  Commission  has  been  entrusted  with  extensive 
responsibilities.  However,  the budgetary appropriations  made  available 
largely  determine  the  discharge  of  these  responsibilities  as  well  as 
the ability to make  progress  in the  way  indicated  in this report. 
126.  As  the  use  of  recycled  plutonium  has  now  reached  routine  commercial 
application,  Euratom  safeguards  continues  to  give  the  necessary 
priority to  the  control  of  the  large  plutonium  fuel  cycle facilities. 
The  necessary  human  and  financial  resources  have  been  determined  for 
these  plants.  In  order  to  keep  the  human  inspection  resources  at  a 
level  consistent  with  the  Commission's  forward  planning,  the 
implementation  of  automated,  unattended  safeguards  systems  will 
continue. 
• 
• 
• 
~  ...  ,f"J • 
• 
AGR 
AECB 
AERE 
AIEA 
AQG 
ARIE  1 
ARIE  2 
ASO 
AWCC 
BCMN 
BHF 
BMFT 
BNFplc 
BSAM 
BTC 
BWR 
CAM 
CBNM 
CCAM 
CCR 
CCTV 
CEA 
CERT 
CMF 
COPO 
COREPER 
CRP 
C/S 
CTC 
CTF 
CTI 
CVD 
DA 
DCS 
DGM 
..  DI 
DOE 
DPC 
DUCA  •  ECSAM 
EDAN 
EDF 
eKg 
EN DAN 
ANNEX  1 
EURATOM  SAFEGUARDS 
Glossary of abbreviations currently used in Safeguards 
Advanced  Gaz-cooled  Reactor 
Atomic  Energy  Control  Board  (Canada) 
Atomic  Energy  Research  Establishment  (Harwell) 
Agence  Internationale de  l'Energie Atomique  (see  IAEA) 
Atomic  Questions  Group  (see GQA) 
Actual  Routine  Inspection Effort  (for Euratom) 
Actual  Routine  Inspection Effort  (for  IAEA) 
Australian Safeguards Office 
Active  Well  Coincidence  Counter. 
Bureau  Central de  Mesures  Nucleaires  (see  CBNM) 
(Geel  Belgium) 
Bulk  Handling Facility 
Bundesministerium  flir  Forschung  und  Technologie 
Brith Nuclear Fuels plc 
Brookhaven Stablized Assay  Meter 
Basic  Technical  Characteristics  (see  CTF) 
Boiling Water  Reactor 
Catch-all  MBA  (=Very  small  installations) 
Central  Bureau  for  Nuclear Measurements  (Geel  Belgium) 
Commission  Consultative  des  Achats et de  Marches 
Centre  Commun  de  Recherche  (see  JRC) 
Closed Circuit Television 
Commissariat  a  l'Energie Atomique 
Comite  Energie,  Recherche  et Technologie  du  P.E. 
Comptabilite Matieres Fissiles 
Cooperation Politique 
Comite  des  Representants  Permanents 
=  COREPER 
Containment  and  Surveillance 
Communication to Council 
Caracteristiques Techniques  Fondamentales  (see  BTC) 
Comite  Technique  Interministeriel pour  !'Euratom 
Cerenkov Viewing  Device 
Destructive Analysis  (see also  NDA) 
Direction controle  de  Securite  (see  ESD) 
Director General  Meeting 
Design  Information 
Department  of  Energy  (UK} 
Dispositions Particulieres de  Controle  (see  PSP) 
Determination of  Uranium  235  Content  Apparatus 
European  Commission  Safeguards  Analytical  Measurement 
committee 
Etat dote  d'Armements  Nucleaires  (see  NWS) 
Electricite de  France 
Effective Kilogram 
Etat  Non-Dote  d'Armements  Nucleaires  (see  NNWS) ENEA 
EP 
ESA 
ESARDA 
ESD 
ESP 
EUR 
FA 
FANT 
FBOM 
FBR 
GFK 
GQA 
HEU 
HLLC 
HLNCC 
HSP 
IAEA 
IAEO 
ICR 
ICT 
!MD 
IMS 
INMM 
IPSN 
ISM 
JRC 
JT 
JTWG 
KFA 
KMP 
LASL 
LEMUF 
LEU 
LFUA 
LII 
LOI 
LLLC 
LOF 
LOVER 
LWR 
MBA 
MBP 
MBR 
MD 
MDC 
MEB 
MIS 
MOX 
MTR 
MUF 
Comitate  Nazionale  per  l 'Energia  Nucleare  e 
Alternativa 
European  Parliament 
Euratom  Supply  Agency  (see  SA) 
l'Energia 
European  Safeguards  Research  and  Development  Association 
Euratom Safeguards  Directorate  (see  DCS) 
Etat  des  Stocks  Physiques  (see  PIL) 
Euratom 
Facility Attachment 
Facility Attachments  Negotiating  Teams 
Follow-up  and  Balancing Of  Mixes 
Fast  Breeder Reactor 
Gesellschaft  fur  Kernforschung  mbh  (Karlsruhe) 
Groupe  des Questions  Atomiques  (see  AQG) 
Highly  Enriched  Uranium 
High  Level  Liaison Committee  (Art.  25  Protocol  VA) 
High  Level  Neutron  Coincidence Counter 
Hexapartite  Safeguards  Project 
International Atomic  Energy  Agency  (see  AIEA) 
Internationals Atomenergie-Organisation  (see  IAEA) 
Inventory Change  Report  (see  RVS) 
Isotopic Correlation Technique 
Inspector Mission  Day 
Integrated Monitoring System 
Institute of Nuclear Materials  Management  (USA) 
Institut  de  Protection et  de  Surete  Nucleaire,  Fontenay-aux-
Roses 
- Inter-Service Meeting 
- Informatics  Systems  Manager 
Joint Research  Centre  (see  CCR) 
Joint  Team 
Joint Technical  Working  Group 
Kernforschungsanlage Julich 
Key  Measurement  Point  (see  PMP) 
Los  Alamos  Scientific Lab  (USA) 
Limits  of Error of  MUF 
Low  Enriched  Uranium 
Limited  Frequency  Unannounced  Access 
List of  Inventory  Items  (see  LOI) 
Liste des  Objets  en  Inventaire  (see LIIJ 
Lower  Level  Liaison  Committee  (Art.  25  Protocol  VA) 
Location Outside Facility  (Holding  less than  1  eKg) 
LOcal  VERification 
Light  Water  Reactor 
Material  Balance  Area  (see  ZBM) 
Material  Balance  Period 
Material  Balance Report  (see  RBM) 
Man-day(s) 
Material Description Code 
Multi  Element  Bottle 
Management  Information  System 
Mixed  Oxide 
Material  Testing Reactor 
Material  unaccounted· For 
• 
• 
.. 
• • 
• 
NCC 
NDA 
NM 
NMACT 
NMTR 
NNPA 
NNWS 
NPT 
NRTA 
NUMSAS 
NVD 
NWS 
OJOM 
OTTO  (list) 
PE 
PICF 
PIL 
PIT 
PIV 
PMP 
PSEP 
PSP 
PWR 
RBM 
RCD 
R&D 
RFS 
RM 
RMS 
RRCS 
RVS 
SA 
SAGS I 
SAM 
SEAM 
SGHWR 
SIC 
SICDB 
SIR 
SMS 
SOH 
SP 
SPI 
SQ 
SRD 
SSAC 
THTR 
TLD 
TNP 
TO  (list) 
UFBR 
UKAEA 
VA 
Neutron  Coincidence  Collar 
Non  Destructive Analysis  (see also  DA} 
Nuclear Material 
Nuclear Material  Accounting  Control  Team  (UK) 
Nuclear  Material  Transfert  Report 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 
Non-Nuclear  Weapon  State  (see  ENDAN} 
Non-Proliferation Treaty  (see  TNP} 
Near  Real  Time  Accountancy 
Nuclear Material Statistical Accountancy  System 
Night  Vision  Device 
Nuclear  Weapon  State  (see  EDAN) 
One  Job-One  Man 
Other  Than  Through  Observation 
Parlement  Europeen  (see  EP) 
Physical  Inventory Control  and  Follow-up 
Physical  Inventory Listing 
Physical  Inventory Taking 
Physical  Inventory Verification 
Point  de  Mesure  Principal  (see  KMP) 
Particular Safeguards Evaluation Procedures 
Particular Safeguards Provisions  (see  DPC) 
Pressurized Water Reactor 
Rapport  de  Bilan Matieres  (see  MBR) 
Reunion  des  Chefs  de  Division 
Research  and  Development 
Rapid  Feedback  System 
Reference Material 
Resource  Management  System 
Rapport  sur  lea Realisations  du  Controle de  Securite 
Rapport  de Variation de  Stocks  (see  ICR) 
-Supply Agency  (see  EAS} 
-Subsidiary Arrangements 
Standing Advisory Group  for  Safeguards  Implementation 
Stabilized Assay Meter 
Safeguards Effectiveness Assessment  Methodology 
Steam Generating Heavy  Water  Reactor 
Summary  Inventory Changes 
Safeguards  Information centre Data  Base  {ADABAS  data base) 
Safeguards  Implementation  Report  {IAEA) 
Safeguards  Management  System 
Senior Officers  Meeting 
Strategic Point 
Summary  Physical  Inventory 
Significant Quantity 
Shipper/Receiver Difference 
State System of Accountancy  and  Control 
Thorium  Hochtemperatur  Reaktor 
Thermoluminescence  Dosimetry 
Traite de  Non-Proliferation  (see  NPT) 
Through Observation  {see also  OTTO) 
Universal  Fast  Breeder Reactor counter 
United  Kingdom  Atomic  Energy  Authority 
Verification Agreement(s) VDC  Variable  Dead-time  Counter 
WGAR  Working  Gro...1p  on  Accountancy  and  Reporting 
WGGC  Working  Group  on  inspection Goals  and  acceptance Criteria 
WPDE  Working  Party  on  Data  Evaluation  • 
WPIA  Working  Party  on  Informatics  and  Accountancy 
WPIP  Working  Party  on  Planning of  Inspections 
WPIT  Working  Party on  Instruments  and  Techniques 
WPSA  Working  Party  on  Safeguards Approaches 
WWTP  Working  Party on  Working  conditions,  Training and  Procedures 
ZBM  Zone  de  Bilan Matiere  (-see  MBA) .  .. 
CHAPTER  VII 
SAFEGUARDS 
Article  77 
In  accordance  with  the  prov1s1ons  of  this  Chapter,  the  Com-
mission  shall  satisfy  itself  that,  in  the  territories  of Member States, 
{a)  ores,  source  materials  and  special  fissile  materials  are  not 
diverted  from  their intended  uses  as  declared  by  the users; 
(b)  the  prov1s1ons  relating  to  supply  and  any  particular  safe-
guarding  obligations  assumed  by  the  Community  under  an  agree-
ment  concluded  with  a  third  State or an  international  organisation 
are  complied with. 
Article  78 
Anyone  setting  up  or operating  an  installation  for  the  produc-
tion,  separation  or  other  use  of source  materials  or  special  fissile 
materials  or  for  the  processing  of  irradiated  nuclear  fuels  shall 
declare  to  the  Commission  the  basic  technical  characteristics  of 
the installations, to  the extent that knowledge of these characteristics 
is  necessary for the attainment of the objectives set out in Article 77. 
The Commission must approve the techniques to be  used for the 
chemical  proces·sing  of  irradiated  materials,  to  the  extent  necess-
ary  to attain  the objectives set  out in  Article 77. 
Article  79 
The  Commission  shall  require  that  operating  records  be  kept 
and  produced  in  order  to  permit  accounting  for  ores,  source 
materials  and special  fissile  materials used  or produced.  The same 
requirement  shall  apply  in  the  case  of  the  transport  of  source 
materials  and  special  fissile  materials. 
Those  subject  to  such  requirements  shall  notify  the  authorities 
of the  Member State concerned of any communications  they make 
to the Commission pursuant to Article 78 and to the first  paragraph 
of this Article. 
The  nature  and  the  extent  of  the  requirements  referred  to  in 
the  first  paragraph  of this  Article  shall  be  defined  in  a  regulation 
made  by  the  Commission  and  approved  by  the  Council. 
Article 80 
The  Commission  may  require  that  any  excess  special  fissile 
materials  recovered  or  obtained  as  by-products  and  not  actually 
being  used or ready  for use  shall  be  deposited  with  the Agency or 
in  other stores  which  are or can  be  supervised  by  the Commission. 
Special  fissile  materials deposited  in  this  way  must  be  returned 
forthwith  to  those  concerned  at  their request. 
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ANNEX  2 
Article  81 
The  Commission  may  send  inspectors  into  the  territories  of 
Member States. Before sending an inspector on his  first  assignment 
in  the  territory  of  a  Member State,  the  Commission  shall  consult 
the  State  concerned;  such  con~ultation  shall  suffice  to  cover  all 
future assignments of this inspector. 
On  presentation  uf  a  document  cstal,lishing  their  authority,  in-
spectors shall  at  all  times  have access  to all  places and data and to 
all  persons who, by reason of their occupation, deal  with materials. 
equipment  or  installations  subject  to  the  safeguards  provided  fo1 
in  this  Chapter,  to  the  extent  necessary  in  order  to  apply  such 
safeguards to ores, source materials and special  fissile  materials and 
to  ensure compliance with  the  provisions of Article 77.  Should  the 
State  concerned  so  request,  inspectors  appointed  by  the  Commis-
sion  shall  be  accompanied  by  representatives  of  the  authorities  of 
that State;  however,  the  inspectors shall  not  thereby  be  delayed  or 
otherwise impeded in  the  performance of their duties. 
If the carrying out of an inspection is  opposed, the Cornmissic.n 
shall  apply  to  the  President  of  the  Court  of Justice  for  an  order 
to  ensure  that  the  inspection  be  carried  out  compulsorily.  The 
President of the  Court of Justice  shall  give  a  decision  within  three 
days. 
If there  is  danger  in  delay,  the  Commission  may  itself  issue 
a  written  order,  in  the  form  of  a  decision,  to  proceed  witi1  th~ 
inspection. This order shall be submitted without delay to the Presi· 
dent  of the  Court  of Justice  for  subsequent  approval. 
After  the  order ur  decision  has  been  issued,  the  authorities  uf 
the  State  concerned  shall  ensure  that  the  inspectors  have  acc~ss 
to  the  places specified  in  the order or decision. 
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Inspectors shall  be  recruited  by  the  Commission. 
They shall  be  responsible  for obtaining and verifying the  records 
referred  to  in  Article  79.  They  shall  report  any  infringement  to 
the  Commission. 
The Commission may issue  a directive calling upon the  Member 
State concerned to  take,  by  a  time  limit  set  by the Commission, all 
measures  necessary  to  bring  such  infringement  to  an  end;  it  shall 
inform the Council  thereof. 
If the  Member  State  does  not  comply  with  the  Commission 
directive  by  the  time  limit  set,  the  Commission  or  any  Memher 
State  concerned  may,  in  derogation  from  Articles  141  and  142, 
refer  the  matter to  the  Court of Justice  direct. 
Article  83 
I.  In the event of an  infringement on the part of persons or under-
takings  of  the  obligations  imposed  on  them  by  this  Chapter,  the 
Commission may impose sanctions on such  persons or undertakings. 
These sanctions  shall  be,  in  order of severity: 
(a)  a warning; 
(b)  the  withdrawal  of special  benefits such  as financial  or tech-
nical  assistance; 
(c)  the placing of the undertaking for a period not exceeding four 
months  under  the  administration of  a  person  or  board  appointed 
by  common  accord of the Commission and the State having juris-
diction  over  the  undertaking;  · 
(d)  total  or  partial  withdrawal  of  source  materials  or  special 
fissile  materials. 
2.  Decisions  taken  by  the Commission in  implementation of para-
graph  I  and  requiring  the surrender of materials shall  be  enforce-
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able.  They may  be  enforced  in  the  territories of Member States  in 
accordance  with  Article  164. 
By  way  of derogation from  Article  157,  appeals  brought  before 
the  Court  of  Justice  against  decisions  of  the  Commission  which 
impose any of the sanctions provided for in  paragraph  I  shall  have 
suspensory  effect.  The  Court  of  Justice  may,  however,  on  appli-
cation  by  the  Commission  or  by  any  Member  State  concerned, 
order that the decision be enforced forthwith. 
There  shall  be  an  appropriate  legal  procedure  to  ensure  the 
protection  of  interests  that  have  been  prejudiced. 
J.  The Commission  may  make  any  recommendations  to  Member 
States concerning  laws  or regulations  which  are designed  to  ensure 
compliance  in  their  territories  with  the  obligations  arising  under 
this  Chapter. 
4.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  sanctions  are  enforced  and, 
where  necessary,  that  the  infringements  are  remedied  by  those 
committing  them. 
Article 84 
In  the  application  of  the  safeguards,  no  discrimination  shall 
be  made on grounds  of  the  use  for  which  ores,  source  materials 
and special fissile  materials are intended. 
The scope of and  procedure for  the safeguards and  the  powers 
of  the  bodies  responsible  for  their  application  shall  be  confined 
to  the attainment of the  objectives set  out in  this  Chapter. 
The Safeguards  may  not extend  to  materials  intended  to  meet 
defence  requirements  which  are  in  the  course  of  being  specially 
,_ 
processed  for  this  purpose or which,  after  being  so  processed,  ar~. 
in  accordance  with  an  operational  plan,  placed  or  stored  in  .• 
military  establishment. 
Article 85 
Where new circumstances so require, the procedures for applying 
the  safeguards  laid  down  in  this Chapter may,  at the  request  of a 
Member  State  or of the  Commission,  be  adapted  by  the  Council. 
acting unanimously  on a  proposal  from  the  Commission  and  after 
consulting the  Assembly.  The Commission  shall  examine any such 
request  made  by  a  Member State. 
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